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Abstract: 
This paper deals with some problems related to the application of monetary policy following 
the Taylor Rule in the theoretical context of a “3-equation model”. The first problem arises if the 
real interest rate does not affect the equilibrium income level itself –as in the IS curve- but its 
rate of growth –as in the dynamic IS that we propose. Secondly, the Taylor Rule is incapable of 
reaching the inflation target when the central bank does not correctly estimate its parameters 
(the neutral interest rate and potential income) or these parameters vary. Our objective is to 
propose an alternative to the Taylor Rule which overcomes both problems. This alternative has 
been called the Tracking Rule, because instead of trying to estimate the neutral interest rate or 
the potential output, the central bank “tracks” these values based on the economy’s evolution, 
particularly on variations in the inflation and unemployment rates. After justifying the dynamic IS 
and explaining the logic of this rule in detail, the paper compares the Tracking Rule with the 
Taylor Rule, simulating both of them in the context of different types of shock in the modified 
three equation model. The results, measured by a loss function, show that the Tracking Rule is 
superior in every single case. It is particularly interesting to evaluate central bank reactions 
derived from the two rules when the economy suffers a large contractive shock such as the 
current crisis. The results show that, with the same shock, the economy is more likely to fall into 
the liquidity trap when the Taylor Rule is applied. 
 
Key words: Monetary Policy; Taylor Rule; Liquidity Trap; Simulations. 
JEL codes: E52, E58 
 
1. Introduction: 
 
In the last few years, macroeconomic policies have primarily been analysed by a “three 
equation model” comprising an IS equation, a Phillips curve with expectations and a monetary 
policy rule, usually the Taylor Rule1. 
In this theoretical context, this paper’s rationale is two-fold. Firstly, the usual IS curve is not 
a satisfactory way of representing how an economy’s real sector operates in the appropriate 
                                                     
1
 A classical presentation of this kind of models is Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999). See also 
Carlin and Soskice (2006) and Galí (2008). On the other hand, Asso, Kahn and Lesson (2007) 
show the theoretical and applied impact of the Taylor Rule. 
term for this macroeconomic policy analysis. As real economies grow at a certain rate with a 
constant interest rate, it is evident that the real interest rate does not affect the equilibrium 
income level itself, but its rate of growth. We have called this relationship between the 
economy’s growth rate and the real interest rate the dynamic IS. Secondly, it is well known that 
the Taylor Rule is incapable of reaching the inflation target when the central bank does not 
correctly estimate its parameters (the neutral interest rate and potential income) or these 
parameters vary2. 
Considering these two problems, the Taylor Rule may well be an inappropriate guide for 
central banks, so we have tried to look for and study an alternative rule. The result is the 
proposed Tracking Rule, so called because instead of maintaining the estimations of the neutral 
interest rate and the NAIRU constant, they are modified according to the variations registered in 
the inflation rate and the level of employment. 
After justifying the dynamic IS and explaining the logic of this rule in detail, the paper 
compares the Tracking Rule with the Taylor Rule, simulating both of them in the context of 
different types of shock in the modified three equation model. The results, measured by a loss 
function, show that the Tracking Rule is superior in every single case. 
It is particularly interesting to evaluate central bank reactions derived from the two rules 
when the economy suffers a large contractive shock such as the current crisis. The results show 
that, with the same shock, the economy is more likely to fall into the liquidity trap when the 
Taylor Rule is applied. Other examples of use of the Taylor Rule for analysing both the origins 
of the crisis and the appropriate monetary policy at this time, can be found in Taylor (2008, 
2009). In a different theoretical context, Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001) already 
analysed the risks of falling into a liquidity trap associated to the Taylor Rule. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the model used and section 3 
justifies dynamic IS in more detail. Section 4 explains the problems associated to the Taylor 
Rule and presents the Tracking Rule proposed as an alternative. The paper then presents the 
simulations used to compare the two rules: section 5 simulates shocks in which the economy 
does not face the possibility of falling into a liquidity trap, and section 6 simulates a contractive 
demand shock which could lead to such a situation, evaluating its likelihood with each rule. The 
paper ends with our main conclusions. 
 
2. Description of the model: 
 
2.1. Equations: 
 
In order to analyse how the two alternative monetary policy rules work, we use a simple 
economic model which is similar to the “three equation model”, but adapted to a dynamic 
context in which productivity, the population and the income are growing in the long term. The 
model comprises the following four equations: dynamic IS, Phillips curve, the relation between 
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 Taylor (1998, page 52), Woodford (2003, pages 286-288), Reis (2003). 
the level of employment and the economic rate of growth, and monetary policy rule. There is 
also a social welfare function to evaluate monetary policy. 
The first equation, called dynamic IS, is an expression in which the income growth rate, 
not its level, depends on the real interest rate, as follows: 
 
D
ttt brDg ε+−= −1         (1) 
 
Where g  is the GDP growth rate, D  and b  are two positive constants, r  is the real 
interest rate and Dtε is an exogenous demand shock. 
The second equation is the usual expression of the Phillips curve in which P&  is the 
inflation rate, n  the percentage of employment relative to the active population and n  that 
percentage when the economy is at the NAIRU. Finally, a  is a positive parameter and Stε  
represents possible exogenous supply shocks: 
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The third equation relates the level of employment to the income growth rate. This 
equation is necessary because the interest rate affects the growth rate, but inflation depends on 
the level of employment. Denoting the income level as Y , labour productivity as A  and the 
active population as L , we have: 
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If we assume that productivity and the active population grow, respectively, at rates γ  
and l , we obtain the following equation in differences: 
  
( )[ ]lgnn ttt +−+= − γ11        (3) 
 
The fourth equation is one of the following two monetary policy rules: 
 
 The first is the Taylor Rule which, in terms of the real interest rate, would be3: 
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 The original Taylor Rule is expressed in terms of the output gap, but it is equivalent to the 
employment gap. 
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where r  is the reference interest rate used by the central bank and TP&  is the inflation 
target. 
 
 The second is the Tracking Rule, and its primary characteristic is that the central bank 
modifies the interest rate set in the previous period according to the changes occurring in 
the level of employment, the inflation rate, and the difference between the latter and the 
target rate: 
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1
α , 
2
α  and 
3
α  are positive parameters. 
 
 The primary objective of this paper is to analyse the economy’s dynamic performance 
under different shocks with each of these two rules. 
 
2.2. Welfare function and shocks: 
 
The welfare function is a quadratic loss function which depends on inflation deviations 
from target and the output gap, where δ  is the discount factor and 
P&
λ  and OGλ  represent the 
weightings of the inflation and income targets: 
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Possible economic shocks are divided according to two main criteria. Taking into 
account the shock’s origin, we distinguish between shocks affecting the growth rate of 
aggregate demand, inflationist shocks, a structural change affecting the NAIRU value and a 
change in the productivity or active population growth rates. 
Depending on the shock’s duration, a first group would comprise transitory shocks, 
represented through an autoregressive process. For example, for a demand shock it would be: 
D
t
D
t 1* −= ερε , where 10 << ρ . A second group would include permanent shocks, in which 
the changes in one of the model’s exogenous variables are so long-lasting that 1=ρ . 
 
2.3. Equilibrium position: 
 
 For the model to be at equilibrium, the four endogenous variables (the growth rate, the 
inflation rate, the employment level and the interest rate) must remain stable. This only occurs 
in the following conditions: 
 
 When the employment level is as corresponds to the NAIRU; otherwise, the inflation rate 
will vary. 
 The growth rate must be equal to the sum of the productivity and active population growth 
rates; otherwise, the level of employment will not remain constant. This sum is called 
“potential growth rate” ( )g : 
 
lg += γ           (6) 
 
 For the above condition to be met, the interest rate must be such that, according to the IS, 
the growth rate is at its potential value. This equilibrium interest rate is called “neutral 
interest rate” ( )r : 
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If these three conditions are met, the inflation will remain stable, albeit at any value. The 
economy, therefore, can reach equilibrium even though inflation is not at the rate targetted by 
the central bank. 
 
3. Justification of dynamic IS: 
 
The intuition underlying the idea of a dynamic IS is that the natural status of an economy in 
which part of the income is saved is to growth at a certain rate, and that changes in the interest 
rate affect that growth rate and not the equilibrium income level. We will try to express this idea 
and to compare it with an alternative formulation. 
 
1. The most simple way of writing the IS equation is: 
 
tt braY −=         (8) 
 
Where  Y  is the equilibrium income value at the end of the multiplier process. We 
call this equation the “static IS”. 
For this formulation to show the growth undergone by real economies, there would 
have to be continuous drops in the real interest rate. Then, in order to adapt this 
formulation to a growing economy, we can suppose that potential GDP ( )POTtY  
grows at an exogenous trend ( )θ  and that the interest rate affects –with a lag- the 
output gap. We could write this “IS with trend” as: 
 
1−
−=
−
= tPOT
t
POT
tt
t bra
Y
YY
OG        (9) 
 
Once we consider the trend, we obtain the potential income at period t, as follow: 
 
( )tPOTPOTt YY θ+= 10        (10) 
 
And the final expression of the IS would be: 
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Or: 
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This formulation, however, does not well resolve the problem of going from a static 
idea of the economy to another with continuous growth. According to expression 
(12), if the interest rate rises during a few periods, the GDP would be beneath its 
potential level by a constant percentage. Moreover, the interest rate would only 
have to return to that value for the output gap to be zero. The period of contraction 
would have made no mark on the economy. In a dynamic economy, however, this 
process would probably be more complex: for the output gap to close, the economy 
would have to grow at more than its potential rate for a few periods (the trend, in 
this formulation), which in turn would require a lower than neutral interest rate. 
2. In the dynamic IS, all expenditure items must depend on income. More specifically, 
for each interest rate, consumption and investment demand values are proportional 
to the period’s income. In other words, in an economy in which income has doubled, 
the number of cost-effective investment projects for a given interest rate will also 
have doubled, and the same will have occurred to consumption demand. It has to 
be assumed, therefore, that economic growth does not alter the consumption/saving 
preference ratio or the viability of investment projects (in proportion to income) for 
each interest rate. 
For the formulation to be dynamic – in Hicks’ terminology, for the period’s 
explanation not to be self-contained – there must be a lag in the mutual 
dependence of income and expenditure. There are two ways in which this can be 
formalised. Firstly, this lag could be because the investment and consumption 
decisions in a period are made by individuals according to the previous period’s 
income, known as the Robertson lag. Denoting total aggregate demand with DA , a 
schematic formulation would be: 
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Alternatively, however, it could be assumed that the production of period t is 
generated with a delay relative to the demand decided in t-1, which will depend on 
the income obtained in t-1 – Lundberg lag-. This gives us: 
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We prefer the second possibility, because it considers the delay between the real 
interest rate and the economic growth rate which we find in real economies4. 
Indeed, from equations (13b) to (16b), we obtain: 
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With 1−+= dCD  and ( )ecb += , we obtain the expression of dynamic IS: 
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 Ball (1997) uses a similar equation, also called dynamic IS, and he also mentions this lag. 
1−
−= tt brDg         (1) 
 
3. This expression is significantly different from the IS in (12). In this expression, we 
can see that direct determination of the output gap according to the period’s interest 
rate is “superimposed” on the long-term exogenous trend. However, in a dynamic 
IS, the interest rate determines the rate of growth, and the output gap evolves 
according to the difference between the real and potential growth rates. We can see 
this in the following expression of a period’s income from (1): 
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If we assume that income is at its potential level in the initial period, from when 
there is a constant interest rate, we have the following expression of income at 
period t: 
 
( )tPOTt brDYY −+= 10        (19) 
 
If the interest rate is neutral in the dynamic IS, the economy grows at its potential 
rate and, with a zero output gap, income will also be at its potential value in all 
periods. If the interest rate is higher than the neutral rate, however, the economy will 
grow at less than its potential rate and there will be a growing negative output gap. 
The difference lies in the fact that when the interest rate moves away from the 
“neutral” rate in (12)5, there is also an output gap, but it remains constant over time. 
Furthermore, in order to eliminate the output gap with the dynamic IS, the interest 
rate would have to be below the neutral level for a time, while it would only have to 
return to its neutral level with expression (12). 
Another difference is found when comparing expressions (18) and (11). In the 
proposed dynamic IS, the interest rate has an impact on the relationship between a 
period’s income and the previous period’s effective income – which has an impact 
on consumer and investment decisions (aggregate demand). In the usual IS, 
however, Say’s Law appears to be applicable, as the reference is always to 
potential income rather than the economy’s actual income. 
 
In our opinion, this more complex description of the economy’s evolution when the 
interest rate varies is also more realistic. Therefore, the use of dynamic IS is particularly 
important because it enables us to explore the difficulties involved in regulating an economy in 
                                                     
5
 The interest rate with which the output gap is zero. In this case: 
b
a
r = . 
which the interest rate affects the growth rate but inflation rate variations depend on the 
difference between effective and potential income levels. 
 
4. The problems of the Taylor Rule and a proposed solution: 
 
4.1. Theoretical problems of the Taylor Rule: 
 
The logic of the Taylor Rule is that the central bank uses a reference interest rate which 
is established providing that the inflation rate is on target and the economy registers its potential 
income level. It would be reasonable to believe, therefore, that this reference interest rate will be 
such that this situation is maintained over time (neutral interest rate). When this condition is not 
met, the authorities change the nominal interest rate in an attempt to obtain a real rate which is 
higher or lower than the neutral rate, depending on the problem to be solved. 
 Is such a rule an appropriate guide for monetary policy? In our opinion, it is not, 
because of two problems associated to the Taylor Rule. 
The first problem arises if the model used by the authorities does not include a dynamic 
IS, because the neutral interest rate they will attempt to estimate to be used as a reference for 
monetary policy will not be appropriate. Indeed, the central bank will estimate an interest rate 
such that the economy will register potential income in the medium term6, when it should – with 
a dynamic IS – estimate the rate that will maintain the economy at potential growth. 
Furthermore, the terms of the rule only include the income level, but not the growth rate. 
This means that monetary policy will react the same to a given output gap, irrespective of the 
economic growth rate. Assuming a negative output gap, the central bank should, however, 
apply a more expansionary monetary policy if the economy is registering a low growth rate than 
if the economy is growing at a high rate. In the first case, the economy’s cyclical status would be 
worsening, whereas in the second it would be undergoing a correction process. 
The second problem facing the authorities when attempting to apply a Taylor-like rule is 
that they cannot observe the two reference values for the application of monetary policy – the 
neutral interest rate and the equilibrium employment level – so they have to estimate their most 
likely values. This estimation, however, is subject to some uncertainty7, so errors can lead to 
unsatisfactory results. 
Orphanides y Williams (2002) believe that the uncertainty regarding the estimation of 
these two variables could be due to not knowing which is the true theoretical model, to the level 
of information available in real-time (when interest rate decisions are made), and to the 
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 This definition is the same as used by Greenspan (1993), Blinder (1998, page 32) and 
Woodford (2003, page 248). 
7
 The difficulty involved in estimating these two variables is empirically documented. For the 
monetary union, for instance, Crespo Cuaresma, Gnan and Ritzberger-Grünwald (2005) 
present a broad summary of the estimates of the neutral interest rate obtained by different 
procedures and the large differences found in the results obtained. Benati and Vitale (2007) 
estimate both the neutral interest rate and the NAIRU, showing that they are both subject to a 
high degree of variability over time and that their estimated value is affected by significant 
uncertainty. Similar conclusions are reached for the United States by Wu (2005). 
existence of different estimation methods. The problem is actually greater: even if the central 
bank has been able to correctly estimate these two variables in a given period, any economic 
shock would alter at least one of the two values. As a result, the central bank would be 
attempting to compensate for the effects of a shock with a rule based on a reference which the 
same shock has changed. 
Assume, for instance, a negative demand shock which moves the IS downwards. If the 
central bank wishes to compensate for this drop in the aggregate demand growth rate, so that 
the economy can continue to grow at its potential rate, it will have to establish a lower interest 
rate. This is the only way to stimulate the growth rate enough while the unemployment rate 
remains constant. The neutral interest rate will therefore have changed. 
If this shock is transitory, for instance lasting for only one period, the neutral interest rate 
will rapidly return to its initial value and the error associated to the Taylor Rule will not be very 
significant, especially if we consider the delay with which monetary policy is effective. These 
one-period shocks, however, are not the most important from a monetary policy perspective, 
and changes in aggregate demand are more likely to disappear gradually, if they do so at all. 
The variation in the neutral interest rate will last longer, then, and the costs derived from 
incorrectly estimating the equilibrium interest rate will increase as shocks persist. 
Likewise, any shock on the supply side will affect the equilibrium values that the central 
bank is using as a reference for application of its monetary policy. Consider an inflationist 
shock ( )0>Stε . To maintain inflation constant will require a higher unemployment rate; the 
NAIRU will therefore change and this is not considered by the Taylor Rule. As before, if the 
shock lasts for a single period, the cost of this will be insignificant, but it will tend to grow as the 
supply shock persists. Another example could be a structural change in how the labour or 
goods markets operate. In this case, the NAIRU would be permanently changed. 
The following section provides a detailed analysis of the problems derived from these 
estimation errors. 
 
4.2. Consequences of an error in the estimation of the neutral interest rate or the NAIRU: 
 
An error when estimating these reference values creates two types of problem: the 
inflation rate that characterises the economy’s equilibrium could be other than the target rate, 
and the adjustment process towards this equilibrium could be too slow and costly or give rise to 
an unstable dynamic process. 
This can be seen by assuming first that there is a permanent shock and analysing the 
economy’s equilibrium (if reached). We then consider the consequences of this error for the 
dynamic adjustment process and the case of a transitory shock. 
Using BCr  to denote the “neutral” interest rate estimated by the central bank and BCn  
to denote the employment level that the central bank believes is compatible with stable inflation, 
the Taylor Rule would be as follows: 
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Earlier, we saw that equilibrium would be characterised by a constant interest rate and a 
constant employment level, that is rr =  and nn = ; if  these two conditions are substituted in 
the monetary policy rule: 
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This expression shows that, whenever there is an error in the estimation of the interest 
rate or the employment level associated to the NAIRU by a central bank which applies its 
monetary policy according to the Taylor Rule, the economy will stabilise at an inflation rate ( )P&  
which differs from the target rate. This “inflationist bias” will be equal to: 
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So inflation will be higher than the target rate whenever the central bank estimates a too 
low neutral interest rate or NAIRU. 
The problem could be even greater, however, if the error is in an upwards direction and 
the central bank has also established a low inflation target; in this case, the equilibrium inflation 
rate could be negative or could even require a negative nominal interest rate to reach the real 
neutral interest rate. The economy would then face the problem of the liquidity trap. Specifically, 
the nominal interest rate that the central bank should establish at equilibrium ( )i  would be: 
 
( )
5.0
5.0 




 −
−−
++=+=
BC
BC
BC
T n
nn
rr
PrPri &&     (23) 
 
Is there a high risk of this rate being negative? It can certainly not be ruled out. If the 
estimated real neutral interest rate is 2% and the inflation target is also 2%, the real neutral 
interest rate would only have to fall by 1.35 percentage points for the equilibrium nominal 
interest rate to be negative, or it would only have to fall by one percentage point if the central 
bank was overestimating the NAIRU by a bit more than one point. 
We will be returning later to this possible economic instability problem. For the time 
being, assume that the economy returns to a new equilibrium after the shock. It is important to 
note that, besides this equilibrium being characterised by an inflation rate different than target, 
the adjustment process will also be a slow one, as a result of using references which are no 
longer valid. 
This monetary policy maladjustment would certainly have a cost in terms of greater 
inflation or employment rate deviations relative to the central bank’s targets, as shown by our 
simulations. 
This also shows that, although the difference between the actual and target inflation 
rates would not be maintained at long-term equilibrium if the shock is not permanent (or if the 
central bank corrects its reference values after a few periods), the problem could extend to any 
shock which persists some time. They all affect the interest rate or equilibrium employment (or 
both) for several periods, in which the Taylor Rule would be setting an interest rate that is not 
the adequate for the economy’s circumstances. 
 
4.3. An alternative monetary policy rule: 
 
What type of rule could prevent these two problems? The alternative proposed here is a 
modification of the Taylor Rule characterised by two principal ideas. 
 
 First, the concept of neutral interest rate that the central bank uses as a reference for its 
monetary policy is derived from a dynamic IS. 
 Secondly, the central bank does not estimate this neutral interest rate or the NAIRU. 
Instead of this, the rule “tracks” these values based on the economy’s evolution, particularly 
on variations in the inflation and unemployment rates.  
 
This Tracking Rule is formally derived from the original Taylor Rule: 
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The two terms which are unknown to the central bank are the neutral interest rate and 
the difference between the effective employment rate and that associated to the NAIRU. How 
can they be identified with the information available? 
If the interest rate applied in the previous period was the neutral rate, the growth rate 
will be at its potential value and the employment rate will remain the same. On the other hand, a 
discrepancy between the actual interest rate and the neutral rate will lead to a change in 
employment, so this variation can be used to know the difference between the current and the 
neutral interest rate. 
Specifically, according to the IS, the period’s growth rate depends on the previous 
period’s real interest rate: 
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Replacing the interest rate with the neutral rate, we obtain the potential growth rate: 
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 But if these two expressions are subtracted: 
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Finally, according to (3), the difference between the actual and the potential growth rate 
is equal to the percentage variation in the employment level. Then: 
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A similar reasoning applies to the NAIRU. If the current employment rate is indeed the 
economy’s NAIRU, inflation would remain stable. However, any difference between the current 
unemployment rate and the NAIRU would be reflected in a change in the inflation rate. Based 
on the Phillips curve: 
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Replacing (24b) and (25) in the Taylor Rule, we obtain the Tracking Rule: 
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Where 
b
1
1
=α , 5.0
2
=α  and 
a
5.0
3
=α . Giving parameter b  a value of 0.8 and a 
value of 0.4 to parameter a 8: 
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 These values are taken from the calibration of a three-equation model by Aarle, Garretsen and 
Huart (2004, table 1, page 418) for the monetary union. 
 As we can see, the logic of the rule would be to start with the previous period’s interest 
rate and change it whenever there are signs that the economy is not at the desired equilibrium. 
Specifically, the central bank should alter the previous period’s interest rate : 
 
1. When employment is varying, as this shows that the growth rate is not at its potential value, 
so the current interest rate is not the neutral rate. For example, if the unemployment rate is 
rising, this means that the interest rate is higher than the neutral rate, and it should be 
reduced by the central bank. With this term, it “tracks” the neutral interest rate. 
2. When the rate of inflation is varying, as this shows that the unemployment rate, however 
constant, is not the equilibrium rate. For example, the central bank should increase the 
interest rate whenever inflation accelerates, as this shows that the unemployment rate is 
lower than the NAIRU, which the central bank is “tracking” with this term of the rule. 
3. When inflation is at other than target level, to prevent the economy from stabilising with a 
constant, but undesired, employment and inflation rate. 
 
As this rule does not include an estimate of the neutral interest rate or NAIRU, it is not 
affected by the problem of the long-term equilibrium of the economy being characterised by 
other than target inflation. Indeed, we saw earlier that, at equilibrium, rrr tt == −1 , 
nnn tt == −1  and 1−= tt PP && , and substituting in (4b), we have that: 
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For the Tracking Rule to be defined as better than the Taylor Rule, we also have to 
compare its ability to take the economy to equilibrium without major fluctuations. The following 
sections therefore simulate different shocks, comparing the economy’s trajectory when the 
authorities apply the Taylor Rule or the Tracking Rule. We can anticipate that one important 
conclusion is that this rule mitigates the excessively cautious monetary policy derived from the 
Taylor Rule. 
It is also important to note some similarities between this rule and the generalization of 
the Taylor Rule proposed by Orphanides (2007) to tackle the problem of uncertainty concerning 
the real values of neutral interest rate and potencial income. This rule is as follows: 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ttYtYTtPtiTit YYYYPPiPri ∆−∆+−+−+++−= ∆− φφφφφ &&& &11  
 
Where iφ , P&φ , Yφ  and Y∆φ  are positive parameters, Y  is the income and Y  is the 
potential income. Taylor Rule would be a particular case of this general rule, where 
0== ∆Yi φφ . According to Orphanides, however, when the uncertainty about estimations of 
neutral interest rate and potential income is high, we should use the values 1=iφ  and               
0=Yφ , so  
 
( ) ( )ttYTtPtt YYPPii ∆−∆+−+= ∆− φφ &&&1  
 
This rule is similar to the Tracking Rule as it uses the interest rate of the previous period 
and not the estimation of the “neutral” interest rate. Nevertheless some important differences 
can be appreciated: 
 
 The potencial growth rate still appears in this rule, although it cannot be observed. It 
is for that reason that, in our rule, the difference between real growth and potential 
growth is substituted by the variation in the employment level, which, in fact, can be  
observed. 
 Orphanides introduces this term as an approximation for the differences between  
effective income and potential income, which is more difficult to calculate. However, 
this term is included in the Tracking Rule to “track” the neutral interest rate based 
on the dynamic IS. 
 While Orphanides removes the term of the output gap, we “track” this gap by 
including the changes in inflation. Our simulations show that the stabilizing 
properties of the Rule are enhanced through the inclusion of the changes in inflation 
above mentioned. 
 
5. Comparison of the two rules when there is no liquidity trap risk: 
 
This and the following section present the results of simulations made to show the 
dynamic adjustment and equilibrium reached by the economy after different shocks. It is initially 
considered that the shock is permanent, but we afterwards continue by considering that the 
shock follows an auto-regressive process. 
We study two main cases. The first, which is approached in this section, is one in which 
the economy is stable with both rules, and we will want to know the inflation deviations from 
target and income deviations from its potential, both at final equilibrium and during the 
adjustment process. The second case, which is found in the following section, analyses the risk 
of the economy finally falling into a liquidity trap with each of the rules, after a significant drop in 
demand. 
The first shock simulated is a one percentage point increase in demand growth. If the 
original situation was equilibrium, the central bank should rise the interest rate so that the 
economy returns to its potential growth rate. 
Assume that the central bank uses the Taylor Rule and maintains the neutral interest 
rate constant at the value estimated before the shock (2%). The central bank increases the 
nominal interest rate, but not as much as it would have if it had perceived the change in the 
neutral real interest rate, which has risen to 3.25%. As a result, it does not prevent the 
unemployment rate from continuing to fall and the inflation rate from continuing to rise (Graph 
1). The increase in employment and greater rise in inflation will lead to correcting monetary 
policy to make it more restrictive, as required by the economy, and this will eventually lead to a 
return to the equilibrium employment level and growth rate. However, not only will this be a slow 
process, because the error in estimating the neutral interest rate is maintained, but, as shown 
by expression (22), the inflation rate will stabilise at higher than the central bank’s target: in this 
case, 4.5% versus the initial 2%. 
In other words, the application of the Taylor Rule to solve a situation of disequilibrium 
(too high growth and a rising output gap) has generated another disequilibrium (a too high 
inflation rate). 
 
GRAPH 1: A PERMANENT DEMAND SHOCK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Model’s simulations. 
 
 
What happens with a tracking rule? In the first period, the central bank increases the 
interest rate more than with the Taylor Rule, because the central bank’s reaction to higher than 
target inflation and to unemployment falling below the NAIRU, as represented in the Taylor 
Rule, is also considered in the Tracking Rule in which the variation in employment also causes 
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the interest rate to rise further, so the central bank is anticipating the increase in the neutral 
interest rate. 
This reduction is sufficient for the growth rate to fall beneath its potential value, so the 
unemployment rate starts to rise. Monetary policy also adapts faster to the restrictive tone 
required in the following periods, because its reference is not a fixed interest rate, but the 
previous period’s interest rate, which is rising. As we see in Graph 1, this does not only prevent 
inflation from rising earlier, but also ensures that the economy returns to its original equilibrium. 
 Finally, the question is how these two monetary policy rules compare if the shock is not 
permanent. As is to be expected, the cost of using the Taylor Rule is smaller when the 
persistence of shocks is smaller, for two reasons. First, because the inflationist bias created at 
equilibrium (expression (22)) disappears. Secondly, because the shorter the shock, the shorter 
is the duration of the central bank’s error in the references used for its monetary policy. 
However, as shown on Graph 2 and Table 1, this cost does not vanish completely, as the rise in 
the growth rate (above the potential level) and inflation (above target) and the reduction in the 
unemployment rate (beneath equilibrium) is greater than with the Tracking Rule. 
 
GRAPH 2: TRANSITORY DEMAND SHOCK (ρ=0,75) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Model’s simulations. 
 
TABLE 1: SOCIAL WELFARE LOSS AFTER A DEMAND SHOCK (+1p.p.)* 
Persistence (ρ) Taylor Rule Tracking Rule
1 0.502** 0.014
0.75 0.07 0.012
0.5 0.0329 0.01
0 0.132 0.009
 
* Value of the social loss function (5) assuming that  5.0== OGP λλ & . 
** When the shock is permanent (ρ=1) the social loss is always rising with the Taylor Rule, 
because the equilibrium inflation rate is not the central bank’s target. The figure in the table is for 
the period in which the equilibrium is reached. 
SOURCE: Model’s simulations. 
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We have also studied what would happen if shocks originate on the supply side. We 
specifically simulated a 2-percentage point increase in the NAIRU which was not anticipated by 
the central bank. As a result of the shock, the initial effect will be an increase in inflation to 
2.8%, and if the central bank applies the Taylor Rule, both the nominal and real interest rates 
will increase. Specifically, the nominal interest rate would go from 4% to 5.2% and the real 
interest rate would be 2.4%. 
This central bank reaction is a move in the right direction and will cause an increase in 
the employment rate, which is required in order to stabilise inflation. Inflation, however, will 
continue to grow, because this new unemployment rate is still below the economy’s new 
NAIRU, although it is above the NAIRU estimated by the central bank. This is very important, 
because even though monetary policy should continue to be restrictive, by calculating the 
Taylor Rule with the wrong NAIRU (too low), the nominal interest rate will rise less than it 
should. Inflation will continue to accelerate and, when the economy returns to the neutral 
interest rate, it will stabilise at higher than the initial rate of inflation (4.3%), as shown on Graph 
3, because the unemployment rate is lower than the NAIRU during nearly the entire adjustment 
process. 
If the Tracking Rule is applied, the same differences occur as in the case of demand 
shocks: the nominal interest rate will grow faster, as the central bank will immediately react to 
the fall in the NAIRU through accelerating inflation. Thanks to this more active monetary policy 
reaction, inflation will start to fall earlier, so both the nominal and real interest rates would 
increase more rapidly. Eventually, the economy would stabilise again at the target inflation rate. 
 Table 2 shows the differences in the value of the Welfare Function derived from 
application of the Taylor Rule or the Tracking Rule when the supply shock has different degrees 
of persistence. 
GRAPH 3: A RISE IN THE NAIRU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Model’s simulations. 
 
INFLATION RATE
0,0000
0,0050
0,0100
0,0150
0,0200
0,0250
0,0300
0,0350
0,0400
0,0450
0,0500
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
TAYLOR RULE TRACKING RULE
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
0,00%
2,00%
4,00%
6,00%
8,00%
10,00%
12,00%
14,00%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
TAYLOR RULE TRACKING RULE NAIRU
NOMINAL INTEREST RATE
0
0,01
0,02
0,03
0,04
0,05
0,06
0,07
0,08
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
TAYLOR RULE TRACKING RULE
REAL INTEREST RATE
0,0000
0,0050
0,0100
0,0150
0,0200
0,0250
0,0300
0,0350
0,0400
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
TAYLOR RULE TRACKING RULE NEUTRAL
TABLE 2: SOCIAL WELFARE LOSS AFTER A RISE IN THE  NAIRU (+2p.p.)* 
 
Persistence (ρ) Taylor Rule Tracking Rule
1 0.477** 0.074
0.75 0.0935 0.063
0.5 0.0572 0.052
0 0.0376 0.044
 
* Value of the social loss function (5) assuming that  5.0== OGP λλ & . 
** When the shock is permanent (ρ=1) the social loss is always rising with the Taylor Rule, 
because the equilibrium inflation rate is not the central bank’s target. The figure in the table is for 
the period in which the equilibrium is reached. 
SOURCE: Model’s simulations. 
 
6. Monetary policy and the present crisis. The liquidity trap risk with both rules: 
 
One of the characteristics of the present crisis is that economies are suffering a large 
and persistent drop in aggregate demand. In the model, this could be seen as a permanent 
contractive demand shock. We would like to see the results of the application of each of the two 
rules in these circumstances and, in particular, the likelihood in each case of the economy 
falling into a liquidity trap. 
This analysis is performed in two complementary manners. We first simulate a fall in the 
demand growth rate, to analyse the differences occurring in the economy’s dynamics depending 
on the rule that is applied. This will show us why the liquidity trap risk is greater with the Taylor 
Rule. We then attempt to evaluate the minimum size of demand shock required for the economy 
to fall into a liquidity trap with each rule, finding that, with the Tracking Rule, this situation occurs 
with shocks twice the size as with the Taylor Rule. 
We therefore start by assuming that the economy is at equilibrium and that the 
aggregate demand growth rate falls by one percentage point, also reducing the neutral interest 
rate to 0.75%. 
How would the central bank reaction in one case or the other? The nominal interest rate 
will fall with both rules, but we have seen here that this reaction will be more cautious with the 
Taylor Rule in the first few periods. As a result, the unemployment rate will continue to grow and 
inflation will continue to fall, although it would already be recovering with the Tracking Rule. 
 
GRAPH 4: A NEGATIVE DEMAND SHOCK AND THE LIQUIDITY TRAP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Model’s simulations. 
 
The problem with this is not only that the economy takes longer to return to equilibrium, 
and not even that this equilibrium would involve a lower than target inflation rate. The problem is 
that, as inflation falls more with the Taylor Rule, the cut required in the nominal interest rate for 
the real rate to be sufficiently beneath the neutral rate is also greater. However, as nominal 
interest rates have a lower limit for monetary policy – they cannot be negative -, the delay with 
which the central banks has acted has increased the risk of the economy falling into a liquidity 
trap with nominal interest rate equal to zero, deflation, rising real interest rates and rising 
unemployment rates, in which case the economy would not return to equilibrium (Graph 4). 
The Tracking Rule does not prevent the economy from falling into a liquidity trap on 
every occasion, however, because if the shock is very large, the real interest rate reduction 
required could be too much to be attained with a positive nominal rate. However, as the central 
bank acts faster with this rule and inflation therefore is less reduced, the economy is less likely 
to fall into a liquidity trap with a given shock, as a smaller reduction is required in the nominal 
interest rate. In other words, the size of the negative shock required for the economy to fall into 
a liquidity trap is smaller with the Taylor Rule than with the Tracking Rule. 
The second part of our analysis consists precisely of evaluating the size a demand 
shock needs to be in order to fall into a liquidity trap with the Taylor Rule and the Tracking Rule, 
and it is shown on Graph 5. With both rules, we have simulated different cuts in the demand 
growth rate, increasing the size of the shock by 0.1 percentage point at a time (abscissa). In 
each case, we show both the minimum nominal interest rate and the minimum inflation rate 
registered during the adjustment process after the shock (ordinate). The conclusions derived 
from this graph are clear: 
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 For any shock size, both inflation and the nominal rate fall more in any period with the 
Taylor Rule than with the Tracking Rule. 
 A 1-point shock would be sufficient for the economy to fall into a liquidity trap with the Taylor 
Rule. Indeed, inflation would be negative in some periods with a drop of less than one 
percentage point. 
 The threshold for the economy to fall into a liquidity trap with the Tracking Rule is 
significantly higher, up to 1.9 percentage points. 
 
GRAPH 5: MINIMUM NOMINAL INTEREST RATE AND INFLATION RATE AFTER A 
NEGATIVE DEMAND SHOCK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Model’s simulations. 
 
7. Conclusions: 
 
The objective of this paper was to propose an alternative to the Taylor Rule which 
overcomes the monetary policy application problems derived from the fact that the NAIRU and 
neutral interest rate values used in the rule are not the real figures, and from the use of a 
neutral interest rate concept derived from static rather than dynamic IS. This alternative has 
been called the Tracking Rule. 
Our analysis of how the model works with the two rules and the results of the 
simulations shows that the use of the Tracking Rule has clear advantages over the Taylor Rule: 
1. When shocks are permanent, the Taylor Rule stabilises the economy with an other than 
target inflation rate. This difference is proportional to the error when estimating the 
neutral interest rate and the NAIRU. As they are not estimated with the Tracking Rule, 
this error does not occur and the inflation rate at which the economy stabilises is always 
the target rate. 
2. As a result of using fixed references, the interest rate variations required after a shock 
occur more slowly with the Taylor Rule than with the Tracking Rule. This means that the 
economy takes longer to return to equilibrium, with greater deviations from target 
inflation and the potential income level. Social losses in the form of the welfare function, 
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therefore, are greater with the Taylor Rule than with the Tracking Rule, with permanent 
or transitory shocks. 
3. If this slower monetary policy reaction takes place during a permanent and persistent 
drop in the demand growth rate, the likelihood of a negative inflation rate is greater with 
the Taylor Rule. 
4. The size of the negative shock that would cause the economy to fall into a liquidity trap 
is significantly smaller with the Taylor Rule than with the Tracking Rule. 
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